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right to counsel in special courts-martial with special attention to:
(i) the concept of military due process as framed by the United States
Court of Military Appeals; (2) the current Constitutional concept of
the right to counsel as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court; and (3) the potential problem raised by the Burns v. Wilson
limitations on federal court review of court-martial cases. It is sub-
mitted that such a reexamination will result in (i) the finding that in
ordinary circumstances the accused's right to counsel will outweigh
military exigency; and (2) the finding that, although the accused's
rights are Congressional in origin, those rights are at least rudimen-
tarily governed by Constitutional precepts.
ROBERT E. PAYNF
COMPELLED MEDICAL AID v. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The religious beliefs and opinions of the individual may not be
interfered with constitutionally;' however, this is not necessarily true of
religious practices. 2 A state may exercise its police power3 in order to
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. Const. amend. I.
This amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (194o). This federal Constitutional grant is also set forth in numerous state
constitutions. E.g., Ala. Const. art. 1, § 3; Cal. Const. art. 1, § 4; Fla. Const. art. i, §
4; Ill. Const. art. 2, § 3; Ky. Const. art. 1, § 1(3); Mass. Const. part i, art. 3; N.H.
Const. part 1, art. 5; N.Y. Const. art i, § 3; Pa. Const. art i, § 3; Texas Const. art.
i,§ 6.
2Morman Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1890); "However free the
exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the
country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as prop-
erly the subjects of punitive legislation." Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343 (1890);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
In City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d 661 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
562 (1941), the Court upheld an ordinance requiring identity badges for people sell-
ing religious material on the streets as being within the police power of a municipal-
ity. In Reynolds, supra, the Court held the laws forbidding bigamy to be con-
stitutional even though the relegious tenets of the individual encouraged such
practices.
3"The Police power of the State invoked and exercised by the Legislature is a
flexible, broad, variable process of government intent upon keeping up to date with
all of the public and social needs. What would be a violation thereof in prior years
might of necessity in an ever-changing world become legal in our present society.
Contrawise, what may have been valid when enacted, as the result of later events
might become unlawful." New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor
Court, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 223, 21o N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 (1961).
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protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.4 Such
exercise of police power, may come into conflict with an assumedly
guaranteed religious practice.5
This exercise of police power has been upheld in cases involving
compulsory vaccination,6 prohibition of snake handling in religious
ceremonies, 7 regulation of distribution of religious literature s and
practice of bigamy for religious reasons,9 but has been denied, the
rights of the individual being considered paramount, in cases involv-
ing school prayers,'0 and the pledge of allegiance and flag salute.'
Police power is exercised when an individual regards certain as-
pects of medical treatment as repugnant to his religious tenets and is
compelled to submit to the repugnant treatment. 12 The constitutional-
ity of compelling such medical treatment for an individual for his own
good instead of for the good of society was considered in In re Brooks'
Estate' 3 by the Supreme Court of Illinois. Bernice Brooks, appellant in
the instant case, was an adult citizen of the United States and had no
"" 'Police power'... is generally held to mean the power, inherent in the Sover-
eign, to prohibit or regulate certain acts or functions of the populace as may be
deemed to be inimical to the comfort, safety, health and welfare of society." Davis,
Brody, Wisniewski v. Barrett, 253 Iowa 1178, 115 N.W.-d 839, 841 (1962).
"The police power is that inherent and plenary power in the state over persons
and property, when expressed in the legislative will, which enables the people to
prohibit all things inimical to comfort, safety, health, and the welfare of society,
and is sometimes spoken of as the law of overruling necessity." Where Drysdale v.
Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 143 S.E. 530, 536 (1928), quotes 23 Ill. L. Rev. 185, 186 (1928).
'Exercise of police power must deal with rights which inhere in the public as
a whole in order to interfere with those rights granted to the individual. Neef v.
City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N.E.2d 947 (1942); Webber v. City of Scottsbluff,
141 Neb. 363, 3 N.W.2d 635 (1942); Kane v. Lapre, 69 R.I. 330, 33 A.2d 218 (1943)-
The governing entity must not act arbitrarily to deprive a person of a right to
which he is entitled. Burley v. City of Annapolis, 182 Md. 3o7, 34 A.2d 6o3 (1943).
The "clear and present danger" test originated in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The Court points out that the action proscribed must involve
more than a possibility of the occurrence of the evil which is intended to be avoid-
ed. There must be a balancing of the gravity of the evil against the improbability
of its occurrence. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951)- Police power may
be exercised when the balance weighs toward the evil's occurrence.
OCude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 8i6 (1964); Comment, 22 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. io5 (1965).
"Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
'City of Manchester v. Leiby, supra note 3.
OReynolds v. United States, supra note 3.
"°School Dist. v. Schempp, supra note 2; Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
"West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 3i9 U.S. 624 (1934); Bolling v. Superi-
or Court for Callam County, 16 Wash. 2d 373, 133 P.2d 803 (1943)-
"lIt has been held that a student has no constitutional right to refuse to sub-
mit to a vaccination as a prerequisite to enrollment in school. Cude v. State, 237
Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964).
"32 Ill. 2d 361, 2o5 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
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minor children. Appellant had been treated for a peptic ulcer for
two years and during this period had repeatedly informed her physi-
cian of her unwillingness to submit to blood transfusions to which
she was opposed on religious 14 and medical grounds. 15 The ulcer be-
came worse and appellant entered a hospital, attended by the same
physician. Appellant and her husband executed documents relieving
the hospital and her physician of all civil liability which might be in-
curred by complications arising from their failure to give her trans-
fusions. The physician felt that her condition was becoming grave and,
in company with the attorney for the Public Guardian and the State's
Attorney, went before a probate court seeking appointment of a con-
servator of the person of appellant.
The judge, exercising his discretionary power to waive notice' 6
under circumstances which he considered involved an emergency,
granted the physician's request upon his testimony that appellant was
incompetent, which made no mention of her instructions given while
in full possession of her faculties. The conservator gave permission for
the transfusions to be given, after which the court, on motion of appel-
lees, issued a second order closing appellant's estate. When appellant
became aware of these proceedings, which had occurred without notice
to her or her husband, 17 she went before the court and made a motion
"'Appellant was a member of Jehovah's Witnesses whose religious teachings
forbid their "eating blood," which they consider analogous to taking a blood trans-
fusion.
'A blood transfusion today is still not entirely without danger to the party re-
ceiving it. See, Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5 th Cir. 1962); Redding v.
United States, 196 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Ark. 1961); Rizzo v. Steiner, 36 Misc. 2d 701,
233 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Necolayff v. Gennessee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 648,
61 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1946), aff'd 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947)-
'The Illinois statute requires only that "the court may require such notice of
the hearing on the petition of incompetency as it deems expedient." Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 3, § i13 (b) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
21t is interesting to investigate what remedies would have been available to
appellant had she received notice of the proceedings when they occurred.
If upon appearance in court and defense upon the merits, appellant had been
judged incompetent, her primary course of action would have been to appeal the
decree. If, as in this case, the time element was important, this course of action
would not be swift enough. By filing ,upersedeas bond pending appeal, appellant
would have stayed execution of the order appointing the conservator.
"(i) In chancery cases and in cases at law tried without a jury, any party
may, within 30 days after entry of the decree or judgment, file a motion
for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the decree or judgment or
to vacate the decree or judgment or for other relief. Neither the filing of
nor the failure to file a motion under this section limits the scope of
review.
"(2) A motion filed in apt time stays execution, and the time for appeal
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for the previous orders to be declared void on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction ab initio. This was denied and appellant appealed.
Appellee's contention was that the question was moot and the ap-
peal should be dismissed. The supreme court held that this case was an
exception to the general rule due to the substantial public interest in-
volved,'8 and granted her request that the order appointing be ex-
volved,'5 and granted her request that the order appointing a conserva-
from the decree or judgment does not begin to run until the court rules
upon the motion." Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 11o, § 68.3 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
The appellant would not have been able to make use of the writ of mandamus,
authorized by Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 87, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1956), because the writ will
not lie where the duty is general and the exercise of judgment and discretion is
involved. Harris v. Schwartz, 351 Ill. App. 351, 115 N.E.2d 345 (1953). Mandamus
does not lie to set aside or undo what has already been done although it should
never have been done in the first place. Board of Educ. v. Idle Motors, 339 IlL. App.
359, 90 N.E.2d 121 (1950).
The writ of prohibition would also be unavailable to appellant because this
writ is issued by a superior court to an iliferior court only when the latter is
exercising jurisdiction belonging to another court. The probate court in which the
proceedings took place was of the kind designated in Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 3, § 113(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1961).
In Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 65, § i (Smith-Hurd 1957), there are provisions made for
obtaining habeas corpus when there are no other remedies available to the petition-
er. This would be inapplicable to appellant because the proceeding under super-
sedeas bond pending appeal is still open to her. If appellant were attempting to
attack the constitutionality of the probate statute, habeas corpus would not be the
proper method. United States ex rel. Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553
(E.D. Ill.), aff'd, 261 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1958).
The federal remedy of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (1949), would be of
possible benefit to appellant if she could show that there had been an exhaustion
of state court remedies, or that there was either an unavailability of state correc-
tive process, or there were special circumstances which rendered such process
ineffective to protect the rights of petitioner. With the remedies available to ap-
pellant it does not appear that this would be considered such a special circum-
stance to cause the federal court to take jurisdiction.
IsIt has been held that in deciding whether to accept an appeal on such a
moot question "it must affect the interest of the body politic, as, for example,
its revenue laws, or some situation 'affected with a public interest' ... where the
state or government is said to be 'as a substantial trustee for the public.'" Willis
v. Buchman, 240 Ala. 386, 199 So. 892, 895 (1940).
Board of Examiners of Plumbers v. Marchese, 49 Ariz. 35 o , 66 P.2d 1035 (1937),
at 1037 stated, "if, although the effect of the particular judgment questioned may
haie ceased, the principle involved therein is a continuing one, courts will some-
times consider the original case in order to avoid a multiplicity of appeals."
New York does not seem to have reached agreement on this point in the
Supreme Court, Appellate Division. In Grossman, Inc. v. Staff, 252 App. Div. 886,
300 N.Y. Supp. 152 (1937), the Second Dep't held that "appeals will not be heard to
settle abstract or academic questions, however important they may be to the general
public or to the legal profession; but only to cure errors affecting injuriously the
rights of some party to the litigation." Id. at 5t (Emphasis added.) But in Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts v. Klau, 1.5 App. Div. 798, 13o N.Y. Supp. 713 (19),
the First Dep't held that "appellate courts not infrequently pass upon questions
1966)
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tor be expunged, thus holding that a woman without dependents, nor-
mally competent but presently incompetent by virtue of physical weak-
ness, may not be compelled by the state to receive life-saving medical
treatment contrary to her religious convictions expressly and relevant-
ly affirmed while competent. The unanimous court said, "It has been
held that governmental actions cannot be proscribed under the ...
[Free Exercise] clause unless they are demonstrated to have a coercive
effect upon the individual, but the presence of that effect here is self-
evident."19
When the individual who is compelled to accept medical treat-
ment is not the only person who would be directly affected,20 the
courts have generally upheld the compelled treatment. For example,
women with minor children have been compelled to submit to blood
transfusions, 2' as have women who were pregnant.22 The state, as
parens patriae, has long been willing to interfere in the parent-child
relationship when the well-being 3 or health 24 of the child is en-
affecting important public interests, even where in the particular case the question
has become academic." Id. at 715. (Emphasis added.)
State ex rel. Freeling v. Lyon, 63 Okla. 285, 165 Pac. 419 (1917), stated that
"we understand 'public interest' to mean more than a mere curiosity; it means some-
thing in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest,
or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected." Id. at 420.
1"205 N.E.2d at 438.
21In the principal case, only appellant's Well-being was jeopardized by her re-
fusal to accept the medical treatment. The Court points out that there are ap-
parently no reported decisions directly on point. 2o5 N.E.2d at 438. One New York
judge, in dictum, stated what his decision would be if ever confronted by this
question: "As to an adult (except possibly in the case of a contagious disease
which would affect the health of others), I think there is no power to prescribe
what medical treatment he shall receive, and that he is entitled to follow his own
election, whether that election be dictated by religious belief or other considera-
tion." People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 2o, 68 N.E. 243, 247 (1903) (concurring opinion)
(failure to provide minor with medical care).
"'Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d iooo, loo8 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
"nRaleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537 (1964).
nPrince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
"[Tlhe State as parens patriae is the supreme guardian of all minors within
its jurisdiction, and ... courts of equity, as part of the State's judicial system, have
inherent power, and will when their jurisdiction is duly invoked, intervene to
protect the welfare and best interest of minor children whose welfare is jeopar-
dized...." Arnold v. Arnold, 246 Ala. 86, 18 So. 2d 730, 734 (1944); "Under the
doctrine of parens patriae a state has the sovereign power of guardianship over
persons of disability, such as minors and incompetent persons." Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, Inc. v. Brodel, 179 P.2d 57, 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
"People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 I]. 618, 1O4 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); State v.
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dangered by parental refusal of medical treatment as contrary to re-
ligious beliefs of the parent.25 Where the state has been unable to
intervene before the child has died, the parents may find themselves
charged with manslaughter.
26
In the principal case, the underlying legal and moral problem which
had to be determined was whether the state should by means of medi-
cal treatment force a person with no one dependent upon him to
continue to live. The court emphasized that appellant was the only
person directly affected by her refusal to submit to the tiecessary treat-
ment.2 7 Apparently, the court assumed that this person's death, if it
should ensue, would not cause another person to become a ward of
the state,28 nor result in the death of another.29 When it is evident that
another's economic well-being or life is dependent upon the person
directly affected by the refusal, there is sufficient clear and present
danger to justifiy state intervention to protect the indirectly-affected
individual. However, in the principal case, the public health was not
endangered, nor was there any threat to the welfare, or morals of the
public. Thus, there were no grounds for subjecting religious practices
to state regulation.
When a court is considering whether the objection of a person with
no dependents is sufficient to prevent compelled medical aid, the
primary substantive issue for determination is his competency to re-
fuse.30 This necessitates the hearing of testimony concerning prior
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 2o, 68
N.E. 243 (19o3); Application of Brooklyn Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621
(Sup. Ct. 1965); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1947).
z"Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free ... to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the
age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (dictum).
'"State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904); Owens v. State, 6 Okla.
Crim. 11o, 116 Pac. 345 (19i1); Trescher & O'Neill, Medical Care for Dependent
Children: Manslaughter Liability of the Christian Scientist, 1o9 U. Pa. L. Rev. 203
(960o).
WHer refusal for religious reasons is analogous to refusal for personal reasons.
If an objecting person is in full possession of his faculties, barring an emergency
making it impossible to consult him, his physician must, to avoid liability, obtain
his consent before beginning treatment. Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir.
1943); Donald v. Swann, 24 Ala. App. 463, 137 So. 178 (1931); Nolan v. Kechijian,
75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949).
These two reasons are apparently equated, because refusal, in either instance,
renders the physician powerless to treat the objector unless he proceeds by means of
having the objector declared incompetent.
2Supra note 21.
20Supra note 22.
In some instances, another person must give consent for an operation upon
an incompetent person. E.g., Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (19o6) (hus-
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objections31 and the strength of conviction in them.3 2 The only proper
way for this determination to be made is for all pertinent information
to be brought before the court. This requires that notice be given to
those having such information. Under the probate statute considered
in the principal case, 33 there is no means of assuring that all these per-
sons will appear at the hearing since the judge may, at his discretion,
waive the notice requirement. In order for such a statute to give ade-
quate protection to an individual, it must make notice mandatory or
incorporate a provision for subsequent legal remedies when there is a
failure to give notice.
34
When no one other than a competent adult citizen is directly or
indirectly affected, it seems that a state's police power cannot be in-
voked to compel medical aid in derogation of one's free practice of
religion. Thus a competent adult with no dependents may not be
forced to accept medical treatment, but this right is left unprotected
unless he is given notice of any proceeding questioning the validity
of his refusal. Louis C. ROBERTS, III
band for insane wife). If the patient is competent to consent, his consent is neces-
sary. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 1o4 N.W. 12, 13 (195o).
"'In the principal case, appellant had repeatedly made it known to her physician
that she would not submit to a transfusion. She again voiced her objection to them
and signed releases of liability upon entering the hospital. These prior objections
were given weight by the Court, who assumed her competency, before dealing with
the question of religious freedom. 2o5 N.E.2d at 438. This information was not
presented in the probate court, but if it had been should have received the same
degree of consideration. Such an objection which has been voiced over a long
period of time should be a strong indication that it is not related to the question
of her competency at the present. Under such circumstances the court should be
hesitant to discount the objection due to a ruling of subsequent incompetency.
A different situation would exist if the objection had been stated in the past,
and there was no evidence that it still existed. The court would then have to hear
testimony as to whether this conviction is still held.
If only objected to after incompetent to object, the court is faced only with
the problem of determining if the objection is merely a result of incompetency.
1If the person still maintains the objections in the face of death, the court is re-
quired to determine only if competently made in the first place. However, many
persons find it easy to adhere to a doctrine, such as appellant's, until faced with
the choice of living or adhering and possibly dying. In the Georgetown College
case, the patient, who objected on the same grounds as appellant, said that the
transfusion would be administered against her will; but if the court ordered it given,
the decision would be out of her hands. Application of the President & Directors
of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d ooo, 1oo5 (D.C. Cir. 1964). If the court feels
that there is a possibility that the objector will not adhere to his objection in the
face of death, it should hear such evidence as is available requiring that the person
attempting to show this lack of strict adherence bear the burden of proof. The
court will be dealing with the question of whether she believes in her doctrine, not
its reasonableness. 205 N.E.2d at 442.3 Supra note 16.
5 Supra note 17.
